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RICO FORFEITURE AND OBSCENITY: PRIOR RESTRAINT
OR SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT?
INTRODUCTION
Society's ongoing debate' about pornography2 raises many difficult
questions. The free speech clause of the first amendment clearly protects
sexually explicit materials but excludes materials deemed to be legally
obscene.' Legally obscene materials, therefore, constitutionally may be
regulated or banned by the states and the federal government. 4 The
boundary between materials that are legally obscene and those that are
sexually explicit but protected by the constitution, however, remains a
"dim and uncertain line."5
Despite the difficulty in defining "obscenity," the federal government
and the states have tried a variety of methods to eradicate it, including
1. Compare I Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 433-
58 (1986) (advocating expansion and vigorous enforcement of obscenity laws) [hereinaf-
ter Final Report I] with The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
51-55 (1970) (recommending repeal of existing obscenity laws) [hereinafter 1970 Com-
mission]. There were significant differences of opinion within these commissions. See
Final Report I, supra, at 335-47; 1970 Commission, supra, at 383-510, 511-628. The issue
of obscenity has sharply divided the Supreme Court for years, as illustrated by the many
dissents in obscenity cases. See eg., Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1924 (1987) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Id at 1924 (Stevens, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 73 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Black, J., and Douglas,
J., dissenting). See generally F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 30-48, 49-58 (1976) (sum-
marizing the Supreme Court's involvement with obscenity regulation and discussing ar-
guments both for and against obscenity regulation) [hereinafter Law of Obscenity]; Final
Report I, supra, at 249-75, 299-351 (analyzing in detail the social and legal questions
relating to the regulation of obscenity and concluding that it should be regulated).
2. Pornography refers generally to sexually explicit materials. The term "pornogra-
phy" should be distinguished from "obscenity," which is a legal term of art used to refer
to materials that are not protected by the first amendment because they fall within the
guidelines established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). See American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330-34 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12-17, at 920-24 (2d ed. 1988).
3. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)); supra note 2. Under Miller a work is obscene if:
(a) ... "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the purient interest...;
(b)... the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) ... the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). For a detailed analysis of
the Miller definition of obscenity and its components, see II Attorney General's Commis-
sion on Pornography, Final Report 1263-1312 (1986) [hereinafter Final Report II]; Law
of Obscenity, supra note 1, at 69-115.
4. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); Roth, 354 U.S. at 492.
5. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); see Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's famous
statement "I know it when I see it" in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring), illustrates the difficulty in defining obscenity.
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criminal laws punishing the sale and distribution of obscene materials,6
civil injunctive proceedings,7 nuisance abatement laws8 and zoning laws.9
Recently, state and federal prosecutors have begun to use the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") 10 and its state ana-
logues" against purveyors of obscene materials.' 2 In 1984, Congress
amended the racketeering law to include obscenity violations as predicate
acts 1 3 because an arguable connection exists between organized crime
and the pornography trade.' 4
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 (1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3502 (1978 &
Supp. 1987); N.Y. Penal Code §§ 235.00 to 235.22 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1988); Va.
Code Ann. §§ 18.2-374 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1957).
8. See, e.g., Note, Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint
Doctrine, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1616, 1617-20 (1984) [hereinafter Enjoining Obscenity];
Note, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior Restraints: The Constitutional Limits of the Nui-
sance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1478, 1485-89 (1983) [hereinafter Pornography,
Padlocks]; see also infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976).
10. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (RICO).
11. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2312 to -2317 (1978 & Supp. 1987); Cal. Penal
Code §§ 186 to 186.8 (West Supp. 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (1986);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-393 to -403 (West 1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1501-
1511 (1987); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 895.01-895.09 (West Supp. 1988); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-
14-1 to -15 (1984 & Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1987);
Idaho Code §§ 18-7801 to -7805 (1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 56 1/2, 1651-1659 (Smith-
Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-6 (Burns 1985) and § 34-4-30.5
(Bums Supp. 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:1351 to :1356 (West Supp. 1988); Miss.
Code Ann. §§ 97-43-1 to -11 (Supp. 1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 207.350 to 207.520
(Michie 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:41-1 to -6.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (1987); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 460.00 to 460.80 (McKinney Supp.
1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (1987); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to 06.1-
08 (1985 & Supp. 1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.31 to .36 (Anderson 1987 &
Supp. 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.715-166.735 (1985); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 911
(Purdon 1983); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-1-1001 to
-1010 (Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1601 to -1609 (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 9A.82.001 to .170 (West 1988); Wisc. Stat. Ann. §§ 946.80 to 946.87
(West. Supp. 1987).
Puerto Rico also has enacted a RICO statute. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, §§ 971 to
971p (1979 & Supp. 1986).
12. E.g., United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987); State v. Feld, 155
Ariz. 88, 745 P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); Bowden v.
State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981); Martinez v. Heinrich, 521 So. 2d 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Sappenfield, 505 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 1106 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), va-
cated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988). The Justice Department has announced that it plans to
seek more racketeering indictments designed to close down major distributors of pornog-
raphy. See Shenon, Justice Dept. Plans Anti-Racketeering Drive Against Pornographers,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
13. The term "predicate acts" refers to the crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp.
IV 1986) as constituting "racketeering activity."
14. Obscenity crimes were added to the definition of racketeering activity after re-
search indicated that organized crime syndicates were involved in the pornography trade.
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RICO constitutes a potent weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal, as it
provides for long prison sentences,' 5 high fines,' 6 severe forfeiture of as-
sets,17 and a variety of injunctive remedies." The use of RICO's power-
ful forfeiture and equitable remedies, however, implicates fundamental
values of the first amendment of the United States Constitution'9 and the
freedom of speech guarantees of state constitutions'0 because full applica-
tion of RICO's provisions can effect a prior restraint on free speech.2"
The use of RICO to enforce obscenity laws has been challenged by
defendants in criminal prosecutions22 and by merchants of sexually ex-
plicit materials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid such
prosecutions.23 The courts adjudicating these challenges have reached
differing conclusions. Some have declared the application of RICO to
obscenity cases unconstitutional in whole24 or in part because it restrains
See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.§ 1961(l) (Supp. IV 1986)); 130 Cong. Rec. S433-57 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Helms); infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text; see also Final Report I, supra
note 1, at 435, 437 (responding favorably to the RICO amendment and recommending
sinilar action to state legislatures). But see also Report of the RICO Cases Committee of
the ABA Criminal Justice Section 39-40 (1985) (avoiding inclusion of obscenity viola-
tions in proposed model racketeering statute because of first amendment concerns) [here-
inafter RICO Cases Report].
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (not more than 20 years).
16. See id (not more than $25,000).
17. See id; see also infra notes 37, 43-58 and accompanying text (detailed treatment
of RICO forfeiture).
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982); see also infra notes 40, 59-73 and accompanying
text (detailed treatment of RICO's equitable remedies).
19. U.S. Const. amend. I. The first amendment of the United States Constitution
provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.. . ." Id. This provision applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
20. Although it is clear that the first amendment applies to the states, see id., the
interpretation given to the first amendment by the Supreme Court sets only the minimum
level of constitutional protection provided by the amendment. See People ex rel. Arcara
v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557-58, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844,
846, on remand from, 478 U.S. 697 (1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987). States are
free to grant greater constitutional protections under provisions of their state constitu-
tions. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (search and seizure); Arcara, 68
N.Y.2d at 557-58, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846 (freedom of speech).
21. See infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987); State v. Feld,
155 Ariz. 88, 745 P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); Bowden
v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981); State v. Sappenfield, 505 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
23. See, eg., J.N.S., Inc. v. Indiana, 712 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1983); Sappenfield v.
Indiana, 574 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Western Business Sys., Inc.. 502 F. Supp.
746 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
24. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504
N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub non. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S.
Ct. 1106 (1988).
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a defendant's future speech.25 Other courts have held that RICO does
not infringe upon first amendment values because its remedies, no matter
how draconian, merely punish a defendant after he has been convicted of
a crime and do not unconstitutionally restrict his future speech.26
This Note argues that the use of RICO to punish those who distribute
obscene materials may infringe upon speech protected by the first amend-
ment.27 This Note suggests, therefore, that the application of RICO's
remedial provisions should be narrowly tailored to preserve the balance
between the state's interest in regulating obscenity and fundamental first
amendment values. Part I examines RICO and its remedial provisions.
Part II explains the prior restraint doctrine in the context of first amend-
ment theory. Part III demonstrates how the application of RICO's re-
medial provisions can act as unconstitutional prior restraints. This Note
suggests limiting RICO's forfeiture and equitable remedies to forfeiture
of specific materials found to be obscene and the proceeds derived from
those obscene materials. Under this analysis, RICO would become a
constitutional punishment for the distribution of specific materials that
are found to be legally obscene, rather than an unconstitutional prior
restraint upon the defendant's prospective protected speech.
I. RICO
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,28 hoping to achieve "the eradication of organized crime in
the United States... by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime."29 Specifically, Congress sought to destroy organized crime by
forcing the defendant to disgorge his profit and by separating the defend-
ant from the corrupted enterprise.30 Twenty-seven states and Puerto
25. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 98, 745 P.2d 146, 156 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (E.D. Va. 1987); West-
ern Business Sys., Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F. Supp. 513, 514 (N.D. Ga. 1980); 4447 Corp. v.
Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988). Several courts have declined to address the first
amendment issues posed by challenges to RICO's use in obscenity cases. See, e.g., J.N.S.,
Inc. v. Indiana, 712 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1983); Sappenfield v. Indiana, 574 F. Supp.
1034, 1037-38 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Western Business Sys., Inc. v. Slaton, 502 F. Supp. 746.
748 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Martinez v. Heinrich, 521 So. 2d 167, 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
27. One state has recognized the effects that RICO's remedies may have on the first
amendment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603.5(6) (Supp. 1987) (expressly forbidding a
court from entering an order under RICO that might be an unconstitutional prior
restraint).
28. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922,
941-48 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (OCCA).
29. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Pur-
pose); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
30. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-28 (1983); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st
1104 [Vol. 56
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Rico3' also have RICO statutes sharing the same intent and adopting
similar remedies.32
A convicted RICO defendant33 may be subject to traditional sanctions
Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). For
detailed accounts of RICO's legislative history, see Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO
Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 70-126 (1985)
and Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
Notre Dame L. Rev. 237, 249-80 (1982) [hereinafter Blakey Reflections] and Lynch,
RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 661, 664-713
(1987) [hereinafter Lynch 1]. Professor G. Robert Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the
Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures in 1969-1970 when the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970 was passed.
31. See supra note 11.
32. State racketeering laws are usually patterned after the federal statute. See
Abrams, Civil RICO'S Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 Tulane Mar.
L.J. 19, 24 n.29 (1987); Lynch I, supra note 30, 715 n.236. Many states, therefore, use
cases construing federal RICO as persuasive authority in construing the state RICO stat-
ute. See, e.g., Alvers v. State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Indiana RICO);
Commonwealth v. Yacoubian, 339 Pa. Super. 413, 419, 489 A.2d 228, 231 (1985) (Penn-
sylvania RICO). On the other hand, state courts have not hesitated to distinguish federal
RICO and the cases construing it. See, e.g., State ex reL Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz.
589, 595-96, 667 P.2d 1304, 1310-11 (1983) (noting differences between state and federal
RICO statutes); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1981) (finding state RICO
statute drafted specifically to avoid ambiguity in federal statute); Commonwealth v.
Taraschi, 327 Pa. Super. 179, 187 n.2, 475 A.2d 744, 748 n.2 (1984) (holding cases con-
struing federal RICO statute not controlling). This Note uses primarily federal case law
and history for an explanation of RICO's forfeiture and equitable remedies.
33. RICO forbids four types of conduct: using or investing any income derived from
a pattern of racketeering activity in the acquisition of any interest in, establishment, or
operation of any enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate commerce, see 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982), using a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of un-
lawful debt to acquire or maintain an interest in, or control over, any enterprise engaged
in or affecting interstate commerce, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982), conducting or partici-
pating in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt, see 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982), or conspiring to violate any of these provisions, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (1982). See also Lynch I, supra note 30, at 680-81 (discussing RICO's substan-
tive provisions).
The definition of "racketeering activity" is a list of enumerated acts that are crimes
under either state or federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1986). These acts
are thought to be crimes in which members of organized crime groups typically engage.
See Lynch I, supra note 30, at 687-88 & n.124. This section was amended in 1984 to
include violations of obscenity laws as predicate acts. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98
Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984).
Section 1961 defines an "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). This provision includes
wholly illegitimate enterprises as "a group of individuals associated in fact." See United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587, 591 (1981).
Section 1961(5) provides that a " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of [RICO] and
the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). This
definition has created a great deal of confusion in the courts. For a thorough discussion
of the pattern requirement problem, see Note, The Pattern Requirement of Civil RICO:
Enterprise Criminals and Multiple Schemes, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 955 (1988).
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such as a fine of not more than $25,000,3' a prison term of not more than
twenty years,35 or both.36 More important, he may be subject to two
novel remedies authorized by RICO. The first of these, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a), permits forfeiture of interests obtained through viola-
tions of RICO, 37 property that affords the defendant a source of influence
over the RICO enterprise, 3 and any direct or indirect proceeds from
racketeering activity.39 The second remedial provision, contained in 18
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 1963(a) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter ... shall forfeit
to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law-
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of sec-
tion 1962;
(2) any-
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of in-
fluence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962;
and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the per-
son obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlaw-
ful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
Id. Most states that have racketeering statutes employ similar forfeiture remedies. See
Cal. Penal Code § 186.3 (West Supp. 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-106 (1986); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-397 (West 1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1505 (1987); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 842-3 (1985); Idaho Code § 18-7804(f) (1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.420
(Michie 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 30-42-4 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.32 (Anderson 1987); P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
25, § 971e (1979); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-15-3 & -3.1 (1985); Utah Code Ann. 76-10-1603.5
(Supp. 1987). This includes thirteen states that expressly classify their forfeiture provi-
sions as civil. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2314(D)(6) (1978 & Supp. 1987); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 895.05 (West Supp. 1988); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-14-7 (1984); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-4-30.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356 (West Supp. 1988);
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-43-9(2) (Supp. 1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.460 (Michie
1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-5 (1987); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-06.1-05(4)(f) (1985 &
Supp. 1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725 (1985); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-1-1006(b) (Supp.
1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.82.100(4)(f) (West 1988); Wisc. Stat. Ann.
§ 946.86(2) (West Supp. 1987). Since a civil forfeiture proceeding does not provide the
same protections as a criminal forfeiture proceeding, these provisions raise interesting
constitutional questions. See generally Evans, "Civil" Forfeitures Under State RICO
Laws: A Legislative Attempt to Circumvent the Constitution, 8 Crim. Just. J. 293 (1986).
38. Id. at § 1963(a)(2).
39. Id. at § 1963(a)(3); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983)
(finding profits and proceeds subject to forfeiture as interests under § 1963(a)(1)).
When Congress originally passed RICO its forfeiture provision provided that anyone
who violates RICO "shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against,
or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, [sic] any
enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in
the conduct of, in violation of section 1962." Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 901(a), 84
1106 [Vol. 56
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U.S.C. § 1964, allows the government to seek civil, equitable orders to
sever a racketeer's connection with the corrupted enterprise and prevent
future violations. 4°
The forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 form an integral part of a
RICO prosecution. 41 Similarly, some describe the civil provisions of sec-
tion 1964 as the most important part of RICO's remedies because their
flexibility allows the court to fashion the remedy that will best remove
the defendant from the enterprise.42
A. Forfeiture
In "order to understand RICO forfeiture and its effects, it is necessary
Stat. 922, 943 (1970). Subsequently, two circuit courts interpreted this section to exclude
forfeiture of profits and proceeds from racketeering violations. See United States v.
McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 464 U.S. 979 (1983);
United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980). While review
of this interpretation was pending before the Supreme Court, Congress added 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(3) to insure that proceeds would be subject to forfeiture even if the Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion under § 1963(a)(1). See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit.
II, § 302, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040 (1984); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 199, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3382. While the bill was pending, the
Supreme Court held that proceeds were subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1). See
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983), aff'g United States v. Martino, 681
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). Section 1964(a) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962... by issuing appropriate orders, including,
but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct
or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise en-
gaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or order-
ing dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the
rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982); see also infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text (discussing
RICO's equitable remedies). The RICO statute expressly grants the government stand-
ing to bring an action for equitable relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
Most state RICO statutes authorize similar civil remedies. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-2314 (1978 & Supp. 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-106 (1986); Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 1505 (1987); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 895.05 (West Supp. 1988); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14-6
(1984 & Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 842-5 to -8 (1985); Idaho Code § 18-7805
(1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-30.5-2 (Burns Supp. 1986); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-43-9(1)
(Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-4 (West 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-8 (1987);
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-06.1-05(4)(a)-(c) (1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.34 (An-
derson 1987 & Supp. 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725 (1985); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 911(d)(1) (Purdon 1983); R-I. Gen. Laws § 7-15-4 (1985); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-
1006(a) (Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601 to -1608 (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 9A.82.100(4)(a)-(c) (West 1988); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 946.86(1) (West Supp.
1987). Puerto Rico also allows equitable relief. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, §§ 971f-971h
(1980).
41. See United States Department of Justice, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations (RICO): A Manual for Federal Prosecutors 76 (1985) [hereinafter RICO
Manual].
42. See 116 Cong. Rec. 602, 693-94 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska, a joint sponsor
of S.1861, which was later enacted as RICO); Blakey, Reflections, supra note 30, at 261.
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to understand its historical roots. Most forfeiture provisions in Ameri-
can law are in rem.43 In rem forfeiture is based upon a legal fiction that
considers the property to be the "guilty" party.44 Because the property is
deemed to be the guilty party, it is named as the defendant and, if it is
found to be tainted, may be forfeited despite the owner's innocence. 45
RICO forfeiture differs from in rem forfeiture because it imposes a
criminal, in personam punishment 46 on a guilty defendant .4  If the con-
victed racketeer's property falls within the broad reach of section
1963(a),48 it is subject to forfeiture under RICO. The defendant must
forfeit the total amount of his proceeds from racketeering activity and all
of his interests in the RICO enterprise. 9
Because RICO forfeiture is in personam and does not depend upon the
legal fiction that the property is tainted, it has been used to cause forfei-
43. See Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests," and Procedural Due
Process, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 57, 62 (1983). In rem forfeiture has long been part of American
jurisprudence. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827). See generally
Reed & Gill, supra, at 62-69. The United States Code contains several in rem forfeiture
provisions. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1453 (1982) (forfeiture of property seized for violations
of the customs laws); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982) (forfeiture of vessels, vehicles and aircraft
used to transport contraband); see also Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal)
Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a
Modern Dilemma, 11 Pepperdine L. Rev. 613, 618 n.30 (1984) (listing federal in rem
forfeiture statutes).
44. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-84 (1974)
(quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15); Reed & Gill, supra note 43, at 62-
69.
45. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
46. In personam forfeiture has strong roots in the English common law. There, con-
viction of a felony resulted in automatic forfeiture of a defendant's property to the crown
and his land to his lord. See Reed & Gill, supra note 43, at 60; Weiner, Crime Must Not
Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. I1l. U.L. Rev. 225, 229-31 (1981).
The most severe type of forfeiture was "corruption of blood." This meant that a con-
victed felon could neither inherit real property, keep the real property that he possessed,
nor pass any property onto his heirs. See Reed & Gill, supra note 43, at 61.
This tradition of forfeiture was rejected in the United States. The framers of the Con-
stitution provided that Congress could have the power to declare a punishment for trea-
son, but that it could not enact a "corruption of blood" or provide for any forfeiture,
except during the life of the person attainted. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
The only example of in personam forfeiture in American history, other than RICO,
was the Confiscation Act of 1862, that allowed forfeiture of property which belonged to
leaders of the southern states that seceeded from the union. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch.
195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862), repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat.
1153 (1909). This Act was later found constitutional. See Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 339, 352-53 (1869); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 312-14 (1870).
47. See United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1347 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546,
549-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969); 116 Cong.
Rec. 591-92 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan, a joint sponsor of S.1861, which was
later enacted as RICO).
48. See supra note 37 (text of § 1963(a)).
49. See United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); Reed & Gill, supra note 43, at 71-72 (describing scope of
RICO forfeiture).
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ture of a myriad of assets. For example, money or other property that
represents the proceeds from racketeering can be forfeited." A job, sal-
ary or bonus can constitute "interests" and therefore be forfeitable under
RICO.51 A defendant's interest in legitimate business entities, such as
corporations, 52 partnerships,53 or limited partnerships,' that are used in
a racketeering scheme are forfeitable. Real property purchased with the
proceeds from racketeering activities5" or used to further the affairs of a
RICO enterprise can be forfeited. 6 Forfeiture of such assets allows
RICO to serve its dual aim of preventing a defendant from profiting from
his crime" and severing his connection with the RICO enterprise."8
B. Equitable Remedies
In addition to forfeiture, RICO gives the government authority to
bring a civil action for equitable relief 9 in order to sever the defendant
from the enterprise that he has corrupted and to prevent him from con-
tinuing the racketeering activity.' In recent years, the government has
made extensive use of RICO's civil provisions to accomplish these reme-
dial aims.6
50. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3)
(Supp. IV 1986). Forfeiture of profits refers to "gross," not "net," profits. See United
States v. Lizza Indus., Inc., 775 F.2d 492, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1082 (1986); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 199, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3382.
51. See United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1242 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United
States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810
(1978), reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979).
52. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980).
53. See United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 828 (1983); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 825 (1983).
54. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1350 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984).
55. See United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1476 & n.23 (9th Cir. 1986); 18
U.S.C. § 1963(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
56. See United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1459 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1189 (1985); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 959 (1983); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
57. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983).
58. See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied, 57
U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (No. 87-1946); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
79 (1969).
59. See supra note 40.
60. See S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Hruska, a joint sponsor of S. 1861, which was later enacted as RICO).
61. See United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g 646 F. Supp.
1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267
(3d Cir. 1985), aff'g 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986);
United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, 663 F.
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Section 1964(a) allows a district court great flexibility in formulating
an order to prevent and restrain RICO violations. 62 The list of remedies
in the statute is not "exhaustive. ' 63 Rather, courts should be guided by
traditional principles of equity in fashioning an order that will achieve
the aim of separating the defendant from the enterprise.'
In conformity with these remedial principles, RICO's civil remedies
have been used in a variety of innovative ways. For example, orders have
been entered appointing a receiver or trustee to conduct the affairs of an
enterprise that has been used for racketeering purposes.65 Preliminary
injunctions have issued to prevent the defendant from engaging in illegal
activities.66 As a final order, a court may issue a permanent injunction to
restrain the defendant from having further contact with the corrupted
enterprise. 67 The government also may seek civil divestiture of the de-
Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Galen, Union Suits, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 31, 1987, at 1; Kohn,
First Civil RICO Suit Filed Against Entire Crime Family, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1987, at 1,
col. 4.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) (reproduced supra note 40).
63. See H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4007, 4034.
64. See id.; cf United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88-89 (1950)
(trial court has broad power to cure ill effects of illegal monopolies and to assure that they
do not continue). See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies 24-91 (1973).
Congress adopted RICO's equitable remedies in order to apply antitrust remedies to
organized crime. See Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1086-
87 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987); S. Rep. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
81-83 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska). Since equitable
remedies had been used successfully against antitrust violators, it was thought that these
remedies could be used effectively to combat organized crime. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Corp., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985); Id. at 510-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Woller.
sheim, 796 F.2d at 1086-87; S. Rep. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 81-83 (1969); see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1982) (antitrust laws). See generally Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief
Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will
Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White Collar Crime?, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 526
(1987). In fact, the Justice Department had already successfully used antitrust laws to
combat organized crime infiltration into unions. See Blakey, Reflections, supra note 30,
at 250 n.39 (citing Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371
U.S. 94, 96-98 (1962) and United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d
806, 807 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966)).
65. See United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1987) (restaurant), aff'g
646 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
780 F.2d 267, 295 (3d Cir. 1985) (union), aff'g 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
66. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, 663 F.
Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D.
Ill. 1976).
67. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). In United States v. Bonanno Organized
Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), the government
sought an injunction to prevent the individual codefendants from associating with one
another. The court declined to address the defendants' arguments that such an injunc-
tion would violate their constitutional right to "freedom of intimate association" because
they were premature. See id. at 1441-42.
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fendant's interest in the enterprise, 68 and civil disgorgement of the de-
fendant's illegal profit.69
Because an action for equitable relief under section 1964(a) is a civil
action, the government possesses several procedural advantages that are
not available in a criminal prosecution. The burden of proof is a prepon-
derance of the evidence,7" the discovery rules of the federal rules of civil
procedure allow the government easier access to information," and a de-
fendant convicted in a criminal RICO case is estopped from contesting
his guilt in a subsequent civil action.72 Because these remedies are flexi-
ble and provide prosecutors with some procedural advantages, they are
likely to be more widely used in the future. 3
C. Obscenity as a Predicate Act
The original version of RICO did not include violations of obscenity
laws as predicate acts. 4 Congress added violations of the federal and
state obscenity laws to the list of predicate acts in the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1984. 71 Senator Jesse Helms proposed this amendment
from the Senate floor because of the "heavy involvement of organized
68. See id
69. See id; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
70. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279 n.12
(3d Cir. 1986), aff'g 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (dictum).
71. See Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1359; Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 Temp.
L.Q. 1009, 1043-44 (1980).
72. See United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192,
194 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 27, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News 4007, 4034; see also County
of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136, 140 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (defendant estopped in civil case
even where the United States was not the plaintiff).
73. See Blakey, Using Civil Suits to Fight Racketeers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1. 1987, at
A23, col. 1.
74. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat.
922, 941 (1970).
75. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984). This act also
amended the forfeiture provisions of RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act. See id. at tit. III, ch. 3, 98 Stat. at 2040.
Many states include obscenity violations as predicate acts by specifically listing federal
or state obscenity laws. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2301(D)(4)(u)-(v) (Supp. 1987);
Cal. Penal Code § 186.2(a)(19) (West Supp. 1988); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-
394(a)(11) (West 1985); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14-3(3)(A)(xii) (1984); Idaho Code § 18-
7803(a)(8) (1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-6-1 (Burns 1985); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-
06.1-01(2)(e)(17) & (18) (Supp. 1987); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.715(5)(a)(J) & (T) (1985); 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 911(H)(1) (Purdon 1983); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602(1)(fff)
& (1)(ijj) (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9A.82.010(14)(s)-(t) (West 1988).
Other states list violations of state obscenity laws and incorporate the predicate acts listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-17-103(5)(a) & (b)(VI) (1986); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1502(9)(a) & (9)(b)(7) (1987); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 895.02(l)(a)(20),
(27) & (1)(b) (West Supp. 1988); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:41-1(a)(1)(e) & (a)(2) (West
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crime in the pornography trade."76 Studies have substantiated his asser-
tion. For example, in 1986 the Attorney General's Commission on Por-
nography conducted an extensive investigation into the connection
between organized crime and the pornography trade and concluded that
organized crime involvement and control was significant." Moreover,
there have been several major criminal prosecutions of organized crime
figures for obscenity violations in the past few years.78
II. THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE
The first amendment forbids state actions that prevent speech or other
forms of expression in advance of actual publication unless it has been
judicially determined that the expression is not protected by the first
amendment. 79 Restraining speech without a judicial determination that
1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75D-3(c)(1) & (2) (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 2923.31(I)(1) & (I)(2)(b) (Anderson 1987).
A few states limit obscenity crimes that may be predicate acts under the racketeering
law to child pornography violations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-43-3(11) (Supp. 1987);
N.Y. Penal Law § 460.10(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-15-1(a)
(1985). "States are entitled to greater leeway [under the first amendment] in the regula-
tion of pornographic depictions of children," New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756
(1982), because the state's interest in protecting children from harm caused by participa-
tion in the commercial pornography industry outweighs the minimal value of child por-
nography. See id. at 756-59.
Hawaii and Puerto Rico so vaguely define "racketeering activity" that it may not in-
clude violations of the obscenity laws. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 842-1 (1985); P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 25, § 971a(b) (1980). Several states omit obscenity violations from their racke-
teering laws altogether, either because the law itself is limited to narcotics violations, see
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 56 1/2, 1653(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:1352(A)
(West Supp. 1988); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-1004(9) (Supp. 1987), or because the legisla-
ture did not intend to include obscenity violations as predicate acts, see Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 207.360 (1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-42-3(A) (1987); Wise. Stat. Ann.
§ 946.82(4) (West Supp. 1987).
76. 130 Cong. Rec. S434 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1984) (statement of Sen. Helms).
77. See Final Report II, supra note 3, at 1037-1213. A commission on pornography
appointed by President Nixon in 1970 concluded that no concrete evidence existed to
support allegations that organized crime controled distribution of "adult materials." See
1970 Commission, supra note 1, at 19, 117-18. The 1986 Commission attributed their
opposite conclusions to the fact that the role of organized crime in the pornography trade
has increased substantially since the 1970 report was issued. See Final Report II, supra
note 3, at 1042.
78. See United States v. DiBernardo, 775 F.2d 1470 (1 1th Cir. 1985), rev'g 552 F.
Supp. 1315 (S.D. Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986); United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982); see also Final Report
II, supra note 3, at 1072-1101 (detailed account of the DiBernardo investigation).
79. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Law of Obscenity, supra note 1, at
228; Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Probs. 648, 648
(1955); Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment The-
ory, 70 Va. L. Rev. 53, 53 (1984). The prior restraint doctrine was first clearly announced
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near, Chief Justice Hughes observed that
a chief purpose of the first amendment was to prevent previous restraints on publication.
See Near, 283 U.S. at 715. Since Near, the Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed
and refined the prior restraint doctrine. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); New
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it is unprotected constitutes the most serious and least tolerable infringe-
ment on first amendment rights."0 The government must meet a heavy
burden of showing justification for a prior restraint on free speech,"1 and
any government action or statute that is alleged to be a prior restraint
will be analyzed according to its operation and effect. s2 In other words, a
court assessing whether a governmental action is an unconstitutional
prior restraint must "cut through mere details of procedure" and evalu-
ate its effect upon free speech.8"
Courts and commentators regard prior restraints as more drastic in-
fringements on first amendment rights than subsequent punishments.'
A prior restraint prevents communication, limiting the "'uninhibited,
robust and wide-open' debate""5 on public questions by preventing ques-
tionable speech from entering the public domain without adequate public
or judicial supervision over the restraint.8 6 A subsequent punishment, on
the other hand, merely imposes a penalty after it has been determined
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). See generally J.
Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, §§ 16.16-16.17, at 866-71 (3d ed.
1986).
80. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Nowak, Rotunda &
Young, supra note 79, § 16.16, at 865.
81. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Carroll v. Prin-
cess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963).
82. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931); see also Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
83. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
84. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *151-52; Nowak, Rotunda
& Young, supra note 79, § 16.16, at 865; Tribe, supra note 2, § 12-34, at 1039-40.
85. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, I.,
concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
86. It has been argued that RICO's penalties are so draconian that they chill pro-
tected speech and, therefore, constitute a prior restraint. See United States v. Pryba, 674
F. Supp. 1504, 1512-13 (E.D. Va. 1987). Chilling occurs when a person chooses not to
disseminate sexually explicit, but not legally obscene, material for fear of prosecution.
See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965); Mayton, Toward a Theory of
First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 266-69 (1982); Schauer, Fear
Risk and the First Amendment. Unraveling the "Chilling Effect." 58 B.U.L. Rev. 685,
693 (1978). Unlike a prior restraint, which is imposed by the government, a chilling of
speech is self imposed. Mayton, supra, at 266-69; Schauer, supra, at 693.
The Pryba court properly rejected this argument relying upon the traditional distinc-
tion between subsequent punishments and prior restraints. See Pryba, 674 F. Supp. at
1516. It held that RICO did not "chill" protected speech because any "chilling" resulted
from the law's legitimate deterrent effect. See id at 1513. In addition, the Pryba court
noted that courts have refused to limit the severity of sanctions that may be imposed
upon violators of obscenity laws. See id at 1516; see also Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d
1326, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987); 511 Detroit St., Inc. v. Kelley, 807 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (6th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3211 (1987). The court, however, did not consider
whether the actual effect of RICO forfeiture constitutes a governmental action that re-
stricts future protected speech, see 674 F. Supp. at 1511-16, as this Note suggests.
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judicially that a person has engaged in unlawful speech or expression.87
The distinction is based upon the notion that "a free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than
to throttle them and all others beforehand., 88
Moreover, because a prior restraint prevents communication before it
has been determined judicially that the speech is unprotected, the protec-
tions of the adversarial system are not present to guard against restraint
of protected speech.89 These protections include the right to an adver-
sarial hearing, the right to an appeal, and, if the case is a criminal obscen-
ity case, the full range of constitutional protections that are available to
criminal defendants.90 Even an injunction restraining a particular book
or movie that is unprotected by the first amendment cannot issue without
an adversarial hearing.91
Last, a restraint upon speech before publication, by its very nature,
requires adjudication in the abstract, because any analysis of the positive
or negative effect that the speech has had upon the public is impossible. 92
A prior restraint prevents speech without considering public reception of
the speech.93 In addition, the mere fact that the speech has been cen-
sored or restrained influences how the speech subsequently is received by
the public.94
The constitutional prohibition against prior restraint is subject to an
exception allowing requirements of decency to be enforced against ob-
scene publications.95 Obscene materials may be restrained in advance of
87. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Nowak, Rotunda &
Young, supra note 79, at § 16.16, at 866-67; Emerson, supra note 79, at 657. In Nebraska
Press Association, the Supreme Court stated: "If it can be said that a threat of... sanc-
tions after publication 'chills' speech, [a] prior restraint 'freezes' it ...." 427 U.S. at 559;
see also supra note 86 (discussing chilling effect).
88. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in
original).
89. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 79, § 16.16, at
866-67; Tribe, supra note 2, § 12-35, at 1042 n.1; Emerson, supra note 79, at 657.
90. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Nowak, Rotunda &
Young, supra note 79, § 16.16, at 866-67.
91. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 439 (1957).
92. See Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Minn. L.
Rev. 11, 49-54 (1981); Redish, supra note 79, at 59, 66.
93. See Blasi, supra note 92, at 49.
94. See id. at 64-69. For example, if the public knows that a movie has been checked
and approved by a censor, they may feel that the movie was 'sanitized' to appease the
censor. See id. at 67.
95. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 687, 716 (1931); see New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Law of Obscenity, supra
note 1, at 229. Two other exceptions to the doctrine exist: the government, when the
nation is at war, may prevent the publication of the sailing dates of warships and the
locations of troops, Near, 283 U.S. at 716; see also New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714
(per curiam) (denying the exception's application to the Pentagon Papers case); Tribe,
supra note 2, § 12-36, at 1047-48 (discussing New York Times Co.), and the security of
the community may be enforced against incitements to acts of violence and overthrowing
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publication,96 because obscenity is not protected by the first amendment,
and the prior restraint doctrine only applies to protected works.9 When
permitting a prior restraint on allegedly obscene materials, the Supreme
Court insists upon strict procedural safeguards to prevent the denial of
first amendment protections for materials that may be sexually explicit,
but are not obscene.
98
III. THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE APPLIED To RICO
A. Strict Construction of RICO
Congress has mandated that RICO "shall be liberally construed to ef-
fectuate its remedial purposes." '99 The Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to this mandate.oo The Court has insisted, however, that when
dealing with the complex web of freedoms that make up free speech, the
method by which the government seeks to restrain an individual's speech
must be closely scrutinized"'1 and that the separation of legitimate from
the government, Near, 283 U.S. at 716; see also National Socialist Party of America v.
Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that an order enjoining
petitioners from marching with or otherwise displaying anti-Semetic materials required
strict procedural requirements).
96. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961). The Times Film
Court limited its decision to the narrow question of whether a program of censorship may
sometimes be constitutional because of the exceptions listed in Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See Times Film Corp., 365 U.S. at 47-49. The standards that a
censorship law must meet in order to pass constitutional muster were delineated in Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). See infra note 98 (discussing Freedman
safeguards).
97. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Law of Obscenity,
supra note 1, at 229.
98. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1963). In Bantam Books,
the Court held that "regulation by the States of obscenity [must] conform to procedures
that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression ......
372 U.S. at 66.
In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court established three procedural
safeguards for a restraint of allegedly obscene material: the censor must seek a judicial
determination on the issue of obscenity and bears the burden of proving that the material
is unprotected; any restraint imposed prior to the judicial determination must be imposed
for a specified, brief period of time and must be limited to preserving the status quo; and
the procedure must ensure a prompt judicial determination of whether the material is
protected. Id. at 58-59; see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
560 (1975) (reaffirming procedural safeguards); Redish, supra note 79, at 78-83 (discuss-
ing the Freedman decision and concluding that the Court erred in allowing any prior
restraint).
99. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(1970).
100. See, eg., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985); Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587
(1981); see also supra notes 33-72 and accompanying text.
101. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
1116 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
illegitimate speech calls for "sensitive tools."' 2 Close analysis of the
government's actions in fighting pornography is required because the line
between protected and unprotected speech is difficult to draw a03 and a
person's future speech is presumed to be protected.' °4
RICO's forfeiture provisions require strict construction 0 5 when they
are used against distributors of obscene materials because of the first
amendment's prohibition against prior restraint. The application of
these provisions should be narrowly tailored, despite the liberal construc-
tion clause, to prevent RICO from having the effect of restraining a de-
fendant's future, presumptively protected speech.' 0 6 Moreover, a narrow
tailoring of these provisions effectively balances the need to preserve im-
portant first amendment values and the need to fight organized crime and
obscenity.
B. RICO's Full Effect is a Prior Restraint
The full effect of RICO forfeiture under section 1963 or divestiture
under section 1964 could cause a defendant who operates an adult book-
store to forfeit his entire bookstore or chain of bookstores, 10 7 because he
was convicted of RICO violations.'01 Such an application would prevent
the defendant from engaging in protected speech, as well as unprotected
expressions of obscene materials."°  Moreover, RICO effectively would
prevent the defendant's future exercise of his first amendment rights be-
102. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
103. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525.
104. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).
105. A strict construction of RICO's forfeiture provisions is not unprecedented. See
United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that RICO, as a
criminal statute, "must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in
favor of lenity" where the government sought forfeiture of the defendant's union leader-
ship position), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in
part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n. 10 (1985) (strict and liberal construction principles are
not mutually exclusive and portions of the RICO statute sometimes may be strictly con-
strued). In Rubin, the court held that forfeiture of a defendant's leadership position in a
union was permissible under RICO's forfeiture provisions, .but construed the statute
strictly to deny the government's request that the defendant forfeit his right to ever run
for a top union position in the future. Rubin, 559 F.2d at 992-93.
106. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 98, 745 P.2d 146, 156 (Ct. App. 1987), cert, de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
107. This Note uses bookstores, which are protected by the first amendment, see Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-55 (1959), for purposes of illustration. The first amend-
ment protects speech in many other contexts including motion pictures, see Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952), stage plays, see Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975), and presumably videotape stores.
108. For an example of the harsh effects that RICO forfeiture can have, see infra notes
164-67 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504
(E.D. Va. 1987)).
109. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
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cause of his past distribution of obscene materials, 110 without regard for
the fact that future expressions are presumed protected until proved ob-
scene at a judicial hearing."'
A comparison of RICO forfeiture and the holding in Near v. Minne-
sota "2 illustrates the harsh effects of RICO forfeiture. In Near, the trial
court found the defendant guilty of publishing libelous and seditious sto-
ries about the local government in his newspaper and enjoined him from
further newspaper publishing.113 The Supreme Court, on review,
stressed that a government action alleged to be a prior restraint must be
analyzed according to its operation and effect1  and held that the injunc-
tion was unconstitutional.115 RICO forfeiture has the same practical ef-
fect-it restrains the defendant's future speech because of his past
misdeeds.' 1
6
In fact, RICO's penalties represent more of an infringement than did
the injunction in Near. Near could have caused the injunction to be
lifted if he returned to court and demonstrated that future issues of the
newspaper would not be defamatory."' In a RICO forfeiture case, the
defendant has no similar recourse because his forum for communication
has been forfeited."' As RICO's forfeiture provisions are mandatory,119
110. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 96-97, 745 P.2d 146, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. CL 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cerL granted sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988); see also Carlin Communications v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.) ("Even when a speaker has
repeatedly exceeded the limits of the First Amendment, courts are extremely reluctant to
permit the state to close down his communication forum altogether."), cert denied, 108
S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
111. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).
112. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
113. IdL at 705. The defendant had challenged the constitutionality of the Minnesota
statute on a demurrer to the complaint and the issue was certified to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which sustained the statute. 1,d; see State ex rel Olson v. Guilford, 174
Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770 (1928). After the injunction became a final order, the defend-
ant again appealed unsuccessfully to the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Near, 283 U.S.
at 706. The Minnesota court upheld the injunction, relying upon its earlier decision. See
State ex reL Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn. 40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929). See generally F.
Friendly, Minnesota Rag (1981) (discussing Near in detail).
114. Near, 283 U.S. at 708.
115. Ia at 722-23.
116. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 96-97, 745 P.2d 146, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 592 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
117. See Near, 283 U.S. at 712.
118. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cerL granted sub noin. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988); see also Hayes, A Jury Wrestles With Pornography, Am. Law. 96.
101 (Mar. 1988) (defendant convicted of RICO left "penniless").
119. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 810-12 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); see also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 200
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a defendant will be restrained in his exercise of his free speech rights even
if his future communications are not obscene.
Although it is true that a defendant may open another bookstore if he
has enough money, the fact remains that his future expressions through a
particular means of communication-the forfeited bookstore-have been
restrained. According to the Supreme Court, "'One is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' "120 Moreover, the
availability of an alternative means of communication is illusory because
a defendant who has been forced to forfeit most of his assets will not have
the economic resources to open another bookstore. 121
C. RICO Compared to a Nuisance Abatement Law
Analogy of RICO's forfeiture and equitable remedies to nuisance
abatement remedies clearly demonstrates the first amendment concerns
raised by RICO's use in an obscenity context. 122 A nuisance abatement
law authorizes civil injunctive relief against obscene materials or places
from which obscene materials are distributed on the theory that they are
a nuisance to society. 123 Usually these laws permit the government to
obtain an injunction preventing a defendant from selling a particular
book or movie after it has been declared legally obscene. 124 This clearly
is constitutional.1 25
Nuisance laws that authorize a court to issue a blanket injunction for-
(noting with approval that courts had held that RICO forfeiture was mandatory), re-
printed in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3383.
120. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (quoting
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). But see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478
U.S. 697, 705 n.2 (1986) (rejecting prior restraint challenge to closure of a bookstore
because the proprietors were "free to carry on their bookselling business at another loca-
tion ...."). The Arcara reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, it is inconsistent
with the prior jurisprudence of Southeastern Promotions and Schneider. See Arcara, 478
U.S. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Supreme Court's argument in Ar-
cara is inconsistent with the values protected by the first amendment. If taken to its
extreme, this reasoning might allow a state to argue that it should be able to bar all public
debate in a city on the theory that the residents can move elsewhere. See Arcara, 478
U.S. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. Cf Pornography, Padlocks, supra note 8, at 1506 (closure under nuisance abate-
ment law).
122. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
123. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-811 to -818 (1982); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 823.05
& .13 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); Idaho Code § 52-401 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 19-1 to
-8.3 (1983 & Supp. 1987). See generally Enjoining Obscenity, supra note 8, at 1617-20;
Pornography, Padlocks, supra note 8, at 1478 n.4.
124. See Enjoining Obscenity, supra note 8, at 1617-20; Pornography, Padlocks, supra
note 8, at 1478 n.4; e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-816 (1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 19-5
(Supp. 1987).
125. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973); Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957).
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bidding the defendant's distribution of any "obscene" materials' 26 or that
order the closing of the premise for any use for up to one year are not
constitutional. 27 The majority of courts find that a statute providing for
the forced closure of real property that has been used in distributing ob-
scene materials constitutes an impermissible prior restraint. 28 Such a
statute prevents a person's future exercise of his right to free speech be-
cause of his past bad acts.1 29
RICO forfeiture is comparable to enjoining operation of an adult
bookstore as a nuisance for three reasons. First, a court assessing a con-
stitutional challenge to a statute must review the challenge according to
the nature of the right threatened, rather than by the power being exer-
cised or the specific limitation imposed. 3 ' Both RICO forfeiture and
closure pursuant to a nuisance statute threaten first amendment rights
and have the effect of preventing future expressions of protected as well
as unprotected speech.' Because nuisance statutes and RICO both
126. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
bane), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam). See generally Enjoining Obscenity, supra
note 8, at 1619-29 (describing such "standards" injunctions).
127. See Pornography, Padlocks, supra note 8, at 1478 & n.4 (citing state statutes);
infra note 128.
128. See, eg., Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135, 138-39 (9th Cir. 1980),
aff'd mene., 454 U.S. 1022 (1981); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159,
165-66 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); State v. Book-
Cellar, Inc., 139 Ariz. 525, 532, 679 P.2d 548, 555 (Ct. App. 1984); People ex reL Busch
v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 59, 550 P.2d 600, 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328,
338, cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 165 Il1. App. 3d
143, 153, 518 N.E.2d 775, 781 (1988); State ex reL Blee v. Mahoney Enterprises, 154 Ind.
App. 244, 289 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. A Motion Picture Entitled
"The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 76-78, 547 P.2d 760, 770-71 (1976); see also 4447 Corp. v.
Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (collecting cases), vacated, 504
N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cerL granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S.
Ct. 1106 (1988).
One court, however, held forced closure of a defendant's place of business as a penalty
for distributing obscene materials constitutional because the closure was a temporary
punishment for past crimes and defendant was free to exercise his first amendment rights
elsewhere. See State ex rel Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451,456-57, 631 P.2d
622, 628-29 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). This position ignores clear
Supreme Court jurisprudence that one's freedom of speech must not be restrained on the
excuse that it may be exercised at some other place. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Pornography, Padlocks, supra note 8, at 1502-06;
supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
129. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1978) (cn
banc), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton,
294 Ala. 657, 665-66, 320 So. 2d 668, 675 (1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
130. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (determining
standard of review for zoning ordinance forbidding live entertainment by the nature of
the right threatened by the state's action); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)
(measuring challenge to order enjoining union organizer from speaking against the right
threatened).
131. Compare 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(considering whether RICO threatens free speech), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987).
cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988) with
Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 163-66 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
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threaten the same rights, courts should subject them to the same
analysis. 1
32
Second, a statute that threatens first amendment rights must be judged
by its effect upon free speech.1 33 The operation of both laws has the ef-
fect of preventing a defendant's future expressions of protected, as well as
unprotected, speech.1 34 A nuisance abatement law prevents future ex-
pression because the defendant's means of dissemination has been closed
by a court order.1 35 Similarly, in a RICO forfeiture context, the defend-
ant's speech is restricted because his means of engaging in speech have
been forfeited to the government.1 36
Third, RICO forfeiture and nuisance abatement laws have similar
aims. They both seek to prevent the defendant from operating a book-
store or movie theater from which he can disseminate obscene materi-
als. 137 RICO seeks to separate the defendant from the RICO enterprise
in order to prevent future violations through both its forfeiture and equi-
table remedies. 3  RICO would allow forfeiture of a bookstore and re-
straint of the defendant's future speech to accomplish this aim. 139
(assessing whether statutory nuisance abatement scheme constitutes an unconstitutional
prior restraint), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
132. In fact, one of the issues before the Supreme Court in 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988) is whether the Indiana Supreme Court erred in not assessing
defendant's constitutional claim by the nature of the right threatened. See 56 U.S.L.W.
3602 (Mar. 8, 1988).
133. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 708, 713 (1931).
134. Compare 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(direct effect of RICO's remedies is the closure of bookstores and theatres), vacated, 504
N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S.
Ct. 1106 (1988) with Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 164-66 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (nuisance statute allows the state to close a theatre for one year), aff'd,
445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
135. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 163-66 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); Pornography, Padlocks, supra note 8, at
1501-02.
136. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub noin. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
137. Compare 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 591 (finding RICO's remedies have goal of
restricting future speech-both obscene and nonobscene) with Universal Amusement Co.,
587 F.2d at 165-66 (observing that statute seeks to prevent future speech based on past
speech).
138. See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 57
U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (No. 87-1946); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846,
857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992
(5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated
in part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
139. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 94-95, 745 P.2d 146, 152-54 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
RICO FORFEITURE
Similarly, a nuisance abatement statute aims to eliminate an undesirable
"nuisance" and prevent distribution of obscene materials by closing
down the premises. 40
Because the full extent of RICO's forfeiture provisions threatens the
same fundamental first amendment rights, has the same effect of closing
bookstores, and has the same purpose of preventing a defendant's future
expressions as does a nuisance statute, RICO's forfeiture and equitable
remedies also can operate as a prior restraint in some cases.14" ' Thus, like
a nuisance statute, the unlimited application of RICO's remedial provi-
sions should be unconstitutional.
D. Content Neutrality
Several courts assert that RICO forfeiture does not violate the first
amendment because it seeks forfeiture only of those assets that constitute
the profits from criminal activity.142 Under this view, forfeiture applies
to any chattel whatsoever, without regard to whether it is protected by
the first amendment.143 Accordingly, the first amendment is not impli-
cated because RICO forfeiture is "content neutral."'"
This view fails to acknowledge that RICO's forfeiture penalties have
two aims. One is to cause forfeiture of the defendant's ill-gotten gains.'45
RICO's other, equally important, objective is to sever the defendant's
connection with the enterprise and to prevent him from engaging in fur-
ther criminal activities."' The same intention also underlies the civil eq-
uitable remedies. 47 Because the statute's intent is to separate a
defendant from his means of expression, it cannot be said that the statute
merely acts as a "content-neutral" forfeiture of profits.' 48 Moreover,
140. See City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 463, 469-70 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 316 (1986); Enjoining Obscenity, supra note 8, at 1617-20.
141. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
142. See, eg., United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1516 (E.D. Va. 1987); West-
ern Business Sys., Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F. Supp. 513, 514 (N.D. Ga. 1980); 4447 Corp. v.
Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559, 565-66 (Ind. 1987), cert granted sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
143. See Western Business Sys., 492 F. Supp. at 514; 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 565-66.
144. See Western Business Sys, 492 F. Supp. at 514.
145. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983); United States v. Ginsburg,
773 F.2d 798, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
146. See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 57
U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (No. 87-1946); United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235,
1242 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1350 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991-92 (5th Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in part,
591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 79 (1969).
147. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
148. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 94-95, 745 P.2d 146, 152-55 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 591 (Ind. Ct.
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even if the forfeiture were neutral as to content, the prior restraint doc-
trine provides no exception for a content-neutral restraint.1
49
RICO forfeiture implicates the first amendment because the forfeiture
sanction, imposed upon a defendant because he has engaged in unpro-
tected speech, prevents future, presumably protected speech.," It is not
the content of the assets being forfeited that implicates the first amend-
ment. Rather, it is the restraint that RICO places upon the defendant's
future expressions of presumptively protected speech that does so.
E. Intent of the Closure
The Supreme Court has permitted the closure of a bookstore in one
limited instance. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 51 the Court upheld the
closure of a bookstore because criminal activity, including prostitution
and solicitation, occurred on the premises. 52 The Court held that
"[b]ookselling in an establishment used for prostitution does not confer
First Amendment coverage to defeat a valid statute aimed at penalizing
and terminating illegal uses of premises."'
' 53
Under this analysis, RICO forfeiture could be used to forfeit a book-
store if the defendant used the premises to engage in criminal activity
unrelated to speech, because ownership or operation of a bookstore by
itself does not render a defendant immune from racketeering sanc-
tions.1 54 In an obscenity case, however, RICO forfeiture penalizes the
App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
149. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), in vacating an
injunction that prevented a public interest group from distributing leaflets, the Court
noted that the injunction operated "not to redress alleged private wrongs, but to suppress,
on the basis of previous publications, distribution of literature 'of any kind.'" Id. at 418-
19; see also 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 591; Pornography, Padlocks, supra note 8, at 1505-
06.
150. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 94-97, 745 P.2d 146, 152-55 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 591 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
151. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
152. See id. at 698-99.
153. Id. at 707.
154. Cf Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (holding closure per-
missible when based upon fact that prostitution and solicitation were ocurring on the
premises); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 166 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (ruling one year abatement procedure could be applied in cases of gambling, prosti-
tution, and liquor law violations, but not in cases of obscenity, bullfighting, and live sex
show violations), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); 660 Lindbergh, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 492 F. Supp. 511, 512 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding closure of a business under
nuisance statute because of acts of lewdness and public indecency does not constitute a
prior restraint). But see People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 335-
37, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 1096-98, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307, 315-17 (1985) (finding closure of book-
store unconstitutional even when aimed at prostitution), rev'd, 478 U.S. 697, on remand,
68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986) (reaffirming earlier holding
under state constitution), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987).
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defendant for his past speech and seeks to restrain his future speech. 55
The important factor in the analysis, therefore, is the purpose of the clo-
sure. Closure or forfeiture effected because of the defendant's speech im-
plicates first amendment concerns and requires a first amendment
analysis. 56 Thus, when a defendant is indicted under RICO, based on
violations of the obscenity laws, first amendment concerns are impli-
cated. 57 Not all applications of RICO's flexible remedies, however, con-
stitute a prior restraint in the obscenity context.'58 RICO, therefore,
remains a powerful tool for combatting pornography within first amend-
ment guidelines.
IV. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF RICO PROVISIONS' 5 9
A. Forfeiture
Under section 1963(a), RICO forfeiture allows the government to seize
a wide variety of items." 6 In order to conform to the Constitution, the
forfeiture provisions should be limited to those assets that are derived
from the distribution of obscene materials or the percentage of the enter-
prise that has been corrupted by the distribution of obscene materials.
The first provision, forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962,161 should be strictly construed to reach only
those interests obtained through the sale of materials proved to be legally
obscene. It is clear that a business entity, such as a bookstore, is subject
to forfeiture under this provision.162 If a defendant is convicted of selling
obscene materials through a bookstore that deals in both protected and
unprotected materials, however, he should forfeit only that percentage of
the enterprise that has been proven to engage in the distribution of le-
gally obscene materials. 163
155. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
156. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
157. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 94-97, 745 P.2d 146, 152-55 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 587.
158. See Feld, 155 Ariz. at 94-96, 745 P.2d at 152-55; see infra notes 160-201 and
accompanying text.
159. The analysis in this Note is limited to the final judgment provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a) (Supp. IV 1986) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). Prejudgment restraining
orders lie beyond the scope of this Note.
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. IV. 1986); supra notes 43-58 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 37 (text of § 1963(a)).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
162. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (corporations, partnerships, and
limited partnerships subject to forfeiture under RICO). Such an entity is subject to forfei-
ture only to the extent that it has been tainted by the racketeer's use of the entity for
illegal purposes. See United States y. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 199, reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3382.
163. This argument was made unsuccessfully by the defendant in United States v.
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For example, in United States v. Pryba,164 the government proved that
the defendant sold $105.00 worth of legally obscene materials. 165 Be-
cause the small amount of materials proved to be obscene constituted a
"pattern of racketeering activity," the government obtained forfeiture of
all of the assets of the defendant's enterprise, 166-three bookstores, eight
video stores and $1 million in assets. 167 In conformity with a constitu-
tional application of RICO, the defendants should have forfeited only the
profits from the sale of those materials proved to be obscene and the
percentage of the enterprise that was engaged in the distribution of le-
gally obscene materials.
RICO's second forfeiture provision allows forfeiture of property that
affords a source of influence over an enterprise. 6s This provision can be
used to forfeit items of property that the defendant has used to further
the affairs of, or to control, a racketeering enterprise. 169 Under the anal-
ysis advanced by this Note, this provision generally is constitutional, but
Pryba. See Hayes, supra note 118, at 100 (discussing defendant's proposed jury instruc-
tions regarding forfeiture).
164. 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987). The Pryba case has generated at least five
judicial opinions. See United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1988) (dis-
cussing expert testimony regarding community standards); United States v. Pryba, 678 F.
Supp. 1218 (E.D. Va. 1988) (ruling on co-defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal);
United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518 (E.D. Va. 1987) (procedural issues related to
RICO forfeiture); United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1987) (ruling on
motion to disqualify counsel).
165. See Corn-Revere, They'll Know It When They Seize It, 16 Student Law. 14, 14-15
(May 1988); Hayes, supra note 118, at 97.
166. The indictment in United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987),
charged the defendants with violating RICO by investing the proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering activity in an enterprise, 674 F. Supp. at 1507-08, conducting the affairs of a
RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, id. at 1508, and conspiring to
violate RICO, id; see also supra note 33 (discussing RICO's substantive prohibitions).
The RICO enterprise was alleged to "consist of the Pryba's, [co-defendant Jennifer] Wil-
liams, Educational Books and seven unindicted corporations." Pryba, 674 F. Supp. at
1508; see also id. at 1509-10 (holding that this was a proper RICO enterprise); supra note
33 (discussing concept of "enterprise").
In order to prove a "pattern of racketeering activity," which "requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (emphasis added), the government
used what arguably could be described as the worst of the defendant's sexually explicit
materials to demonstrate at least two violations of obscenity laws that would constitute a
pattern. See United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225, 1227-28 (E.D. Va. 1988) (de-
scription of the obscene materials); Corn-Revere, supra note 165, at 16 (noting that
although the materials that constituted the pattern would "make a healthy person retch,"
the remainder of the defendant's business was not obscene and "[b]etween 75 and 80
percent of the tapes were not erotic, but were intended for general audiences").
Once the government proved a pattern of racketeering activity, all of the defendant's
interests in the enterprise were subject to mandatory forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
(Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
167. See Hayes, supra note 118, at 97.
168. See United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1459 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1189 (1985); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
169. See RICO Manual, supra note 41, at 85-86; supra notes 43-58 and accompanying
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should be subject to certain limitations.' 7"
For example, items in the bookstore's inventory that have not been
proved to be legally obscene may not be forfeited because they are pre-
sumed to be protected by the first amendment.17' Neutral instrumentali-
ties of dissemination, such as cash registers and bookshelves, should not
be forfeited because that would prevent the defendant from engaging in
protected speech.' 72 If the defendant owns a bookstore or other real
property, the court should not allow RICO forfeiture to prevent the de-
fendant's use of that forum for future expressions.17 3 Such a forfeiture
would have the same effect as a nuisance abatement law and, therefore,
would prove unconstitutional.
74
The second forfeiture section would be constitutional when the prop-
erty forfeited has enabled the defendant to control the enterprise but is
not vital to the exercise of first amendment rights. 7  For example, a
motor vehicle that was used in the enterprise's affairs could be forfeited
under this provision.1
76
RICO's third forfeiture provision allows forfeiture of profits and pro-
ceeds from racketeering activity. 17 7 This refers only to profits from the
sale of materials that are not protected by the first amendment. 78
Materials that have not been declared obscene are presumed pro-
tected.' 79 Therefore, a defendant cannot be punished for distributing
them.' "0
Applying the third provision is constitutional if forfeiture is limited to
profits and proceeds, or assets bought with the profits, derived from
materials specifically adjudged obscene."' Forfeiture in those circum-
stances is a subsequent punishment for unprotected expression and, as
such, usually is deemed constitutional.' 2 Moreover, RICO forfeiture of
170. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 97, 745 P.2d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
171. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).
172. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 97, 745 P.2d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); cf State v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 139 Ariz. 525, 532-33, 679
P.2d 548, 556 (Ct. App. 1984) (nuisance abatement law); State v. A Motion Picture Enti-
tled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 75-76, 547 P.2d 760, 771 (1976) (same).
173. See Feld, 155 Ariz. at 97, 745 P.2d at 155.
174. See supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
175. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 97, 745 P.2d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
176. See Martinez v. Heinrich, 521 So. 2d 167, 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
177. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3)
(Supp. IV 1986).
178. See Feld, 155 Ariz. at 97, 745 P.2d at 155.
179. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).
180. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 97, 745 P.2d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
181. See id
182. See United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (E.D. Va. 1987); see supra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text (distinguishing between subsequent punishments and
prior restraints).
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proceeds resembles a fine in the amount of money the defendant obtained
through criminal activities, I"3 because it allows the defendant to satisfy
the judgment with neutral assets.1 84 His future speech, therefore, is not
restrained.
B. Equitable Remedies
RICO's civil provisions give a district court authority to issue equita-
ble orders directing a defendant to divest himself of his interest in an
enterprise, ordering the defendant not to engage in the same activities as
the enterprise engaged in or ordering the dissolution of the enterprise.' 85
Most of the remedies listed in section 1964(a) probably constitute uncon-
stitutional prior restraints if used against a purveyor of pornography., 6
An order directing the defendant to divest himself of all interests in the
enterprise has the same effect as forfeiture of those interests under 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1).18 7 Such an order would effectively prevent the de-
fendant's future expressions by forcing him to give up all interest in his
means of communication. Thus, a divestiture order would result in an
unconstitutional prior restraint because it would prevent the defendant's
future, presumptively protected, speech based on his past misdeeds.' 88
An injunction preventing the defendant from engaging in the same
type of business as the enterprise engaged in also is unconstitutional.1 89
If the order directs the defendant not to operate a bookstore or movie
theater, it operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 90 Even an in-
junction limited to ordering the defendant not to sell or distribute any
type of "obscene materials" has been held unconstitutional as a prior
restraint.' 9' An injunction of this nature falls within constitutional
bounds only if it is directed at a specific book or movie that a court has
found legally obscene.' 92
Last, an order directing the dissolution or reorganization of an enter-
prise that has engaged in the dissemination of unprotected speech is also
183. See United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 576 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
821 (1985).
184. See United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1515-16 (E.D. Va. 1987); see also
Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1337 (9th Cir. 1987) (imposition of a high fine was a
criminal penalty, not a prior restraint); 511 Detroit St., Inc. v. Kelley, 807 F.2d 1293,
1299 (6th Cir. 1986) (fine for illegal activity can be paid from lawfully earned money),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3211 (1987).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). For text of § 1964(a), see supra note 40. Many
states authorize similar remedies. See supra note 40.
186. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 96-97, 745 P.2d 146, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
187. See id. at 96-97, 745 P.2d at 154-55; supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
188. See Feld, 155 Ariz. at 96-97, 745 P.2d at 154-55.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U.S. 1022 (1981). See generally Enjoining Obscenity, supra note 8, at 1620-29.
192. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957).
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unconstitutional. 93 An order of this nature parallels laws revoking a
bookstore's or movie theater's corporate license if the owner is convicted
of an obscenity violation.' 94 These laws offend the Constitution because
they restrain future speech while punishing past, unprotected speech. 9 5
RICO allows the court a great deal of flexibility in structuring an order
to achieve the statute's remedial purpose. 96 Because this flexibility ex-
ists, the court could structure an order that accomplishes the purpose of
preventing future disseminations of obscene materials, yet still preserves
fundamental first amendment rights. For example, one court has used
section 1964(a) to appoint a receiver to run a restaurant that had been
used by the defendants to skim profits and defraud the government of tax
revenues.' 97 Similarly, at least one court has used civil RICO to appoint
a trustee to conduct the affairs of a union that had been dominated by
organized crime figures.' 98 In the same way, a court constitutionally
could appoint an impartial administrator or receiver to monitor the de-
fendant and insure that he does not distribute materials that are legally
obscene. Such an order, of course, must be strictly drawn so as to pro-
vide the procedural safeguards necessary to prevent restraints upon pro-
tected speech.' 99 As the most important of these safeguards is the
requirement that the administrator seek judicial review in any case in
which the administrator wants to restrain the defendant from distribut-
ing particular materials,2" this type of order would require close judicial
supervision of the administrator's efforts in order to protect fundamental
first amendment interests.2°'
193. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 96-97, 745 P.2d 146, 154-55 (C. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
194. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert. granted sub norm. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
195. See, e.g., City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 463, 470
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 316 (1986); Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. City of Miami, 719
F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v.
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); see
also 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 592 (Ind. C. App. 1985) (collecting
cases), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), cert granted sub norm. Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
196. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
197. See United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g 646 F.
Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
198. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 295-96 (3d.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
199. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text;
see also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. CV 84-469
AWT, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1987) ("A state may not simply close down the forum
of a provider of sexually suggestive messages; instead, it must either prosecute vigorously
under its obscenity laws or establish a prior-review permit system with procedures that
satisfy the requirements of Freedman v. Maryland.") (available on LEXIS).
200. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
201. Such an order would require a great deal ofjudicial supervision, see id., and there-
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CONCLUSION
Several states and the federal government use RICO as a weapon in
the war against pornography. A connection between organized crime
groups and the pornography trade may justify such use. RICO's wide
ranging forfeiture and civil remedies have the potential, however, to cre-
ate unconstitutional prior restraints on a defendant's future, presump-
tively protected speech. In order to prevent such an unconstitutional
application, RICO's remedial provisions should be narrowly tailored to
preserve fundamental first amendment freedoms and prevent restrictions
upon protected speech.
John J. O'Donnell
fore might impose a burden on the judiciary. First amendment rights are so fundamental,
however, that judicial supervision over any censorship program is essential. See id.
